Coalitions and accountability : multi-party government in the age of MMP by Doyle, Martin M.
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
0745 
1995 
MARTIN DOYLE 
. ' 
COALITIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Multi-party Government in the Age of MMP 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
ADVANCED PUBLIC LAW (LAWS 545) 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERS11Y OF WELLINGTON 
1995 
-ABSTRACT 
The Electoral Act 1993 provides for the proportional representation of political 
parties in the House of Representatives. Single-party majority government 
which has prevailed over recent decades will, most likely, give way to either 
minority or coalition government. Coalitions are, at their best, fine examples of 
co-operation between parties and exemplify the consultation and consensus-
building that many see as the appropriate alternative to the 'elective 
dictatorship' of government by single party majority cabinets. The single-party 
mandate to enact specific policy planks is replaced in a coalition by the 
imperative to consult partners, and often non-government parties, on policy. 
Increased consultation between parties is not only the result of the need for 
coalition government. It is rather a product of the new era in which parliament generally, and the select committees in particular, have become more 
significant in the legislative process. While coalition government will be the most demonstrable symbol of the decline of single party dominance, it is the 
product of an era of increased power sharing. A majority coalition government 
is no less powerful than a single party government. Indeed, elective dictatorship by coalition is possible. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 15,000 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers the issue of accountability when applied to coalition 
government. Constitutional accountability as a concept has risen in 
importance in recent decades and the demand for it is demonstrated in 
many of the conventions and practices of Government and Parliament. 
These conventions and practices have developed mainly in an era 
dominated by two political parties. One of the effects of the Electoral Act 
1993 will, almost certainly, be the representation in parliament of a greater 
number of political parties than has traditionally been the case. Another 
possible effect is coalition government. This paper discusses aspects of the 
established understanding of accountability and applies them to coalition 
government. It also assesses the implications of coalition government on 
established mechanisms of accountability. 
Chapter II defines the words accountability and coalition. In particular, it 
draws a distinction between political accountability and constitutional 
accountability. It notes that political accountability centres on the 
identification of who is to be held accountable, who will hold them 
accountable, and for what they will be held accountable. Constitutional 
accountability is not specifically about issues of promise and performance. It 
centres, rather, on the way in which a government relates to other parties, 
parliament and the community in reaching decisions and passing legislation 
through the House. It is a process rather than a contractual product. The 
chapter notes Lord Hailsham's concept of the "elective dictatorship" and 
uses this as a model for the lack of constitutional accountability. Accountable 
government entails various conventions, practices and systems support the 
active participation of all parties. The result is accountable governing. It is 
demonstrated through openness, consultation and co-operation. The nature 
of coalition government establishes a new set of variables within the 
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constitutional framework surrounding cabinet government. The chapter 
notes the variety of forms to be found even within coalitions. 
Chapter III provides an historical perspective to parties, accountability and 
coalitions in New Zealand. It notes that major political parties were not part 
of the colonial General Assembly. As a result, members were not 
constrained by party discipline and temporary coalitions between factions 
and individual members developed. Some individuals and factions 
coalesced in order to hold strong government accountable. It notes the 
advent of major parties, the occurrence of coalition governments in three 
eras of this century. Elective dictatorship is described in New Zealand. The 
chapter concludes by summarising key aspects of the Electoral Act 1993 
and explaining why the Act represents a constitutional revolution. Reasons 
are given for why coalition government is more possible under the electoral 
framework provided by the new Act. 
Chapter IV examines issues of accountability as they apply to a coalition 
Cabinet. Particular aspects covered include the selection and role of the 
Prime Minister, election and selection of ministers, and the cabinet's 
relations with caucus and parliament. The presence within cabinet of 
representatives of more than one party enables the cabinet to monitor itself 
to some degree. However, in an age of participatory democracy, there is a 
pressing need for coalition agreements to be communicated to the 
electorate. The chapter discusses the significance of the doctrine of 
collective responsibility for coalition cabinets. 
Chapter V considers accountability in the context of caucus. Since the 
Electoral Act has broken new ground by making provision for political 
parties, the individual caucuses of elected parties could be presumed to be 
of vital importance to the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system 
(MMP). The irony is that proportional representation, in enabling several 
parties to be significantly represented in the House, makes single-party 
majority caucuses very unlikely. For a coalition government, there is perhaps 
no government caucus as such. Instead, there may be several caucuses of 
the government coalition partners. Even opposition caucuses have a role in 
the modern concept of government. While the era of the powerful, single-
party government caucus has, almost certainly, gone, the era of coalition 
building and coalition government redefines the role of caucus and offers it a 
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dynamic role in the delivery of accountability. Government caucuses will 
almost certainly gain in power over their cabinet ministers. 
Chapter VI turns to Parliament, the institution which provides the members 
who form coalition governments. Constitutionally, governments answer to 
Parliament. Parliament's power to make and unmake governments is 
highlighted in the MMP era due to the number of political parties in the 
House and also due to the increased number of members. A greater number 
of views will be represented in the MMP parliament and these will be 
reflected in the work of the select committees and in the type of legislation 
that is passed in the House. Coalitions will form the government as well as 
arising informally in opposition ranks to challenge the government or to 
contest particular divisions. Parliament, in the age of MMP, will adapt to the 
demand for greater consultation and co-operation between parties. New 
Zealand, however, has a recent history of single party governments which 
have at times behaved like 'elective dictatorships'. This chapter considers 
how accountable a coalition government will be to Parliament and what 
degree of responsibility Parliament takes for coalition government. 
Chapter VII summarises the key points made in the paper to support the 
thesis that coalition government not only occurs in an era of increasing 
accountability, but is itself a form of government that offers new levels of 
accountability involving all parties and indeed all members of the House of 
Representatives. 
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II DEFINITIONS 
The words coalition and accountability are central to this paper. In order to 
clarify their precise meanings and how they are used in the paper, this 
chapter offers definitions and discussion. 
I COALITION 
A Definitions 
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines a coalition as " ... [a] 
temporary combination of parties1 etc. that retain distinctive principles" .2 
Parkin defines political parties themselves as "coalitions"; a party is "simply 
a collection of politicians who have banded together for the purpose of 
achieving and maintaining office" .3 This paper focuses on accountability in a 
context in which two or more parties have banded together to form a 
government in which cabinet positions are occupied by members of more 
than one party. It also acknowledges that individual members of Parliament 
are coalitionable. 
B Forms of Coalition 
There are many possible forms of coalition government and each one has its 
own implications for accountability. Boston points out that one way to 
categorize governments is according to whether they hold a majority or 
Parties are not essential to coalitions. Independent MPs are also coalitionable. 2 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5 ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993) vol 1, p 427. 
3 Michael Parkin Microeconomics (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Ontario, 1990) 516. 
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minority of seats in Parliament.4 For coalitions, as for all other forms of 
government, there are in the normal course of events only two options: 
majority coalition government or minority coalition government. 
Boston observes that multi-party governments can be sub-divided in various 
ways: 
1 Number of parties in the coalition 
Relative size of the parties 
Ideological cohesion 
Maximum or minimum winning coalition 
An oversized coalition 
Grand coalition of all the major parties 
An all-party coalition 
A minority coalition government can be sub-divided according to 
various criteria, such as the nature and degree of the support it 
receives from opposition parties. 
C Informal Coalitions 
While describing what is meant by a coalition, it is also necessary to confirm 
what it is not. Coalition is the most overt and significant way in which parties 
can, within the constitutional framework, operate together to govern the 
country. There are many other forms of co-operation between parties which 
do not amount to coalition government. These forms include the 
appointment of members of second parties to non-executive positions, 
arrangements and agreements between parties concerning parliamentary 
voting and support for the government, and the work of multi-party Select 
Committees. The paper acknowledges that these forms of inter-party co-
operation can sometimes be described as informal coalitions which, in some 
cases, amount to a first step towards formal coalition. 
II ACCOUNT ABILITY 
There are two important types of accountability - political and constitutional -
that apply to government. Both types are important to the discussion of 
4 J Boston "The future of cabinet government in New Zealand: The implications of MMP 
for the formation, organisation and operations of the cabinet" (Working Paper Series 3/94, 
Graduate School of Business and Government Management, Victoria University, 1994) 3. 
7 
coalition government. This paper concentrates on constitutional 
accountability. 
A Political Accountability 
Political accountability is based on the premise that specific parties make 
specific promises to the electorate prior to an election. If elected to the 
House of Representatives, the parties are then expected to behave in 
accordance with their election promises, either as members of government 
or of the opposition. The electorate has the opportunity to hold the parties 
accountable at the following election either by returning them to office or not. 
Implicit in the idea of responsibility is the clear knowledge of who is 
responsible . For responsibility to be real , someone or some body must be 
nominated for the role of being liable to be called to account. If no specific 
person or party can be called to account then true political accountability 
does not exist. It could be said that this occurs in the case of a coalition 
government that forms following an election and which does not go to the 
next election on a coalition ticket. It is neither voted into office or out of 
office, although its constituent MPs or parties may be indirectly held to 
account by voters. 
There are major problems in attempting to hold governments accountable 
for election manifestos. The manifestos are developed by small numbers of 
party workers and are not voted on clause by clause at a general election . 
The party or parties which eventually become government may not have 
received a percentage of the popular vote that justifies wholesale delivery of 
the promises contained in the manifesto. Also, governing is an ongoing 
process that by convention is characterised by participatory democracy. 
Rigid adherence to election planks runs counter to concepts of public 
consultation and active , inter-party co-operation . A broader concept of 
accountability is required in the age of MMP. 
B Constitutional Accountability 
The paper examines coalition government in the light of constitutional 
accountability. When applied to government, constitutional accountability 
concerns the way a government governs within the constitutional 
framework. Whereas political accountability focuses on whether a party 
5 
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keeps its election promises once in office, constitutional accountability is 
more concerned with the way the government includes other parties and 
groups in the development of policy and legislation. A government has 
responsibility for the good administration of the nation and is not simply a 
vehicle for party politics.5 One of the ills of traditional party competition 
has been the way minority interests have been shut out of decision 
making. MMP involves participatory democracy. Accountability in modern 
New Zealand government is increasingly evidenced by openness, 
consultation with others and receptiveness to alternative ideas. In 
particular, it involves power sharing, co-operation between parties, and 
respect for minor interests. 
1 Lack of accountability 
MMP, and with it the increased prospect of coalition government, has arisen 
in New Zealand following a period of heightened frustration with 
governmental practices and systems that were found to be deficient in terms 
of constitutional accountability. The lack of accountability is not unique to 
New Zealand governments. In other countries it has been associated with 
two-party systems featuring strong single-party government. Hailsham has 
noted:6 
[R]epresentative institutions are not necessarily guardians of freedom, 
but can themselves become engines of tyranny. They can be 
manipulated by minorities, taken over by extremists, motivated by self-
interest or organized millions. We need to be protected from our 
representatives no less than from our former masters. 
Significantly, Hailsham comments on the British system of government 
which is provided with a second chamber. The unicameral nature of the New 
Zealand House of Representatives renders it more vulnerable to 
manipulation by a dictatorial executive as well as the rapid passage of ill-
considered legislation. 
The Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s19. 
Lord Hailsham The Dilemma of Democracy (Collins, London, 1978) 13. 
9 
2 Elective dictatorship 
Hailsham described the traditional system as an "elective dictatorship" in 
which governments used their sometimes narrow majorities to impose on 
the majority changes for which the majority never consciously voted.7 
Usually two major opposing parties alternated in power dependent on 
elections, and once in control of the government apparatus reversed the 
policies of the previous government. From an Australian perspective, Wright 
justifies the sharing of power with democratic principles:8 
Many writers refer to the desirability of 'strong government', and this is 
usually interpreted to mean a government capable of outvoting any 
opposition. In a democracy, the only acceptable strong government must 
be a government strongly supported by those governed. 
To summarise, Hailsham and Wright share a view that strong, single-party 
government that inflicts its agenda on parliament and the people is not good 
government. It is not constitutionally accountable government. Accountable 
government consults, and involves other people and parties in the process 
of formulating policy, dr"afting legislation, and passing it into law. The 
resultant legislation can be said to have the support of, rather than simply 
the opposition of, other parties in the House. By joining with the government 
party in this process, every party within parliament in a real sense 
participates in government. Coalition government is the formal sharing of 
power, while co-operation and consensus between parties amount to an 
informal sharing of power. 
Disraeli is reported as saying, "Parliamentary government is party 
government. You cannot have one without the other. "9 Certainly, the 
constitutional significance afforded political parties under the Electoral Act 
1993 demonstrates the reality of this statement in a New Zealand context. 
Hailsham says the problem of government by a majority party is that "you 
cannot appeal effectively from the legislative proposals of a government to 
7 Aboven6,21. 8 JFH Wright Mirror of the Nation's Mind: Australia's Electoral Experiments (Hale and lremonger, Sydney, 1980) 19. 9 Above n 6, 100. 
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the majority in the House of Commons"; in this way, the people's will is not 
adequately protected against arbitrary government.10 
3 Limited government 
The alternative to such tyranny is, according to Hailsham, limited 
government which is characterised by diversity, justice, protection of minority 
and individual interests, and the rule of law. In place of concentrating power, 
it diffuses power. In such a system, majority government may not pass what 
laws it wills, and individuals and minorities have rights against elected 
authorities. 
The traditional party system worked satisfactorily when parties did not 
attempt to press a narrow electoral advantage too far and respected this 
convention. Hailsham proposed that the institutions of government be 
structurally altered so that: 11 
... the will of the majority will always prevail against that of the party 
composing the executive for the time being, and that, whoever may form 
the government of the day will be compelled to follow procedures and 
policies compatible with the nature of Parliamentary democracy and the 
rule of freedom under law. 
The New Zealand parliament has enacted various legislation in recent 
decades providing instruments to assist in making government more 
accountable. Examples include the Ombudsmen Act 1975, the Official 
Information Act 1982, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Human 
Rights Act 1993, and in 1985 the comprehensive development of the role 
and powers of the select committees. While helping to 'limit' government and 
make it more accountable, neither individually nor collectively did these 
measures succeed in curtailing the duopoly of the major parties or periodic 
demonstrations of elective dictatorship. The electoral framework enshrined 
in the Electoral Act 1956 enabled the elective dictatorship to become as 
much a reality in New Zealand as it had in Britain. 
Above n 6, 101 . 
Above n 6, 22. 
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III BACKGROUND TO THE ELECTORAL ACT 1993 
The Electoral Act 1993 represents a constitutional revolution . In order to 
illuminate aspects of its significance for coalition governments, this chapter 
gives a brief historical sketch of earlier eras in New Zealand political history 
when parties were not as central to the working of government. It then 
considers parties and their purpose . It examines the role and performance of 
parties in the First Past the Post era. The concept of the elective dictatorship 
is examined, along with the concept of accountability and limited 
government. In conclusion, the chapter considers the Electoral Act 1993 and 
its broad constitutional implications. 
I COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 
The history of constitutional law in New Zealand can be viewed in terms of 
evolving statutory mechanisms assisting enhanced representation of popular 
opinion on the one hand and accountability of representatives on the other. 
A Early Constitutional Arrangements 
Following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the New Zealand 
Colony was administered by a Governor sent with instructions from 
England.12 Early settlers resented this form of off-shore government and 
desired their own representative parliament. 13 The New Zealand 
Constitution Act 1852 (UK) provided for provincial assemblies, a House of 
Representatives and a Legislative Council whose members were appointed 
for life. Governor Grey initially delayed implementing the Act on the grounds 
12 TR Smith Parliamentary Government in New Zealand (RE Owen, Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1965) 6. 13 Above n 12, 7. 
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that it would enable an effective dictatorship of minority white settlers over 
the majority Maori population .14 
B Colonial Government 
1 Lack of party discipline 
Bohan has described 19th century New Zealand parliamentary life, noting its 
absence of strong party organisation and "its emphasis on personalities and 
shifting cabals" .15 The atmosphere suited a political leader who could 
manage "turbulent and unreliably independent parliamentarians" .16 
Members were not afraid to make individual stands on issues. The four 
Maori members did not always vote as a bloc 17 and even cabinet ministers 
would oppose each other on the floor of the House.18 
2 Leadership 
Support for particular leaders could centre on personalities, philosophies or 
provincial origins. Both for reasons of government and opposition, leaders 
needed to together individuals and groupings of members into coherent, but 
informal, coalitions. For example, on Tuesday 20 May, 1856, as a member 
of the Opposition, Stafford was able to gather enough support from 
"disparate elements" in the General Assembly to win five divisions in one 
day against the Fox ministry. The following day, he successfully led a 
confidence vote against the government. After portfolios were redistributed, 
a weakness in the free voting structure surfaced. In the absence of the 
hierarchy associated with clear party structures, it was not apparent who 
would be premier in the new ministry. 19 
14 Above n 12, 8. The proposed system would "give to a small fraction of her subjects of 
one race the power of governing the large majority of her subjects of a different race". 
15 E Bohan Edward Stafford: New Zealand's First Statesman (Hazard Press, 
Christchurch, 1994) 9. 
16 Above n 15, 9. 
17 Above n 15, 286. 
18 In 1867, during a debate over cuts to inter-colonial and inter-provincial services, 
cabinet ministers Hall and Richmond opposed Premier Stafford and minister Fitzherbert. See 
above n 15, 249. 
19 Above n 15, 95. 
20 
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3 Unifying factors 
Stafford wished for members to "forget their distinct origins and their long 
hatred, and to prepare them to coalesce into a strong and united nation".20 
In 1866, the third Stafford Ministry contained ministers who had been 
previous political opponents of Stafford as well as two ministers from the 
second Stafford ministry.21 It could be called a coalition of factions rather 
than a coalition of parties. The lack of strong party divisions enabled Stafford 
to appoint the most suitable people, in one case a vociferous opponent, to 
important positions.22 Stafford delivered a new Ministerial statement "in as 
fresh a tone as if no policy had ever been sanctioned by him before - as if he 
were a new Premier of a new party which had just won their way to office" .23 
It was a cabinet whose members were drawn from the General Assembly in 
its broadest sense rather than from one narrow political faction within it. 
4 Accountability 
Issues of accountability affecting the 19th century parliament included the 
inaudibility of Vogel's Financial Statement in 1869;24 rushed legislation that 
allowed insufficient time for debate;25and the lack of information made 
available to the Assembly about major policy initiatives.26 Consultation 
between the government and the opposition occurred over matters of 
common policy.27 The 19th century parliament apparently expected its 
governments to be accountable to it, to keep it informed and allow it to 
debate policy. Political realities sometimes undermined these expectations. 
Particularly if the opposition was weak or disorganised - a state of affairs 
more likely where individual members are not united in common parties - a 
government could ignore some constitutional conventions. To ensure 
Above n 15, 99. 21 Above n 15, 230. 22 In 1866, Premier Stafford appointed a long-standing rival, James FitzGerald, New Zealand's first Comptroller General. See above n 15, 235. 23 Lyttelton Times, Lyttelton, New Zealand, 27 August 1866. Quoted in E Bohan Edward Stafford: New Zealand's First Statesman (Hazard Press, Christchurch, 1994) 232. 24 Above n 15, 290. 
25 Above n 15, 293. 
26 Above n 15, 293. 
27 Above n 15, 301. 
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compliance with convention, it eventually proved necessary to gather 
together the disparate elements of the opposition.28 Another such example 
is the Dommett ministry of 1861. It contained four main factions which 
attracted fluctuating support from uncommitted members.29 From a modem 
perspective, these 'gatherings' of individuals can be seen as the first moves 
towards the formation of parties rather than coalitions of parties. 
Il THE ADVENT OF PARTIES 
A Parties Become Established 
Major political parties gradually developed in the early decades of the 20th 
century. This paper will not trace their history apart from making some 
general points about the reason for parties and why they have sometimes 
coalesced. 
B Reasons For Parties 
The political function of parties seems straightforward: to propose and 
implement policies.30 Parties cannot have a major influence over legislation 
and national policy while in opposition. Parties want and need power in order 
to be effective. It seems a self-evident fact that political parties want to be in 
government in order to implement their programmes. 
C Party Politics 
Modern political parties seek control over the legislative chamber. ·1n 
constitutional terms the main function of a political party is to capture and 
control the behaviour of the Parliament. In that sense a political party is 
certainly subversive of the institution of Parliament."31 Party politics are so 
central to New Zealand's parliamentary life that governments are normally 
described according to the party its ministers belong to, for example, "We 
28 In 1871, Stafford rallied the opposition members in order to confront what Bohan 
describes as "Vogel's arrogant trampling on parliament's right to discuss and direct policy". 
See above n 15, 313. 
29 Above n 15, 177. 
30 J Blonde! Political Parties: A Genuine Case for Discontent? (Wildwood House, 
London, 1978) 19. 
31 G Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming Our Political System 
(Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992} 130. 
32 
33 
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have a National government" or "Labour has come to power". Palmer has 
noted the influence of parties and raised points with a bearing on 
accou ntabi I ity: 32 
The conduct of political parties, both in their organisations generally and 
in their arrangements in caucus, are subject to very little law indeed and 
hardly any constitutional conventions either. These are the institutions 
which deal with political competition in the community, but they are 
subject to almost no safeguards or restraints. To underline the point 
consider what the parties and caucus have the ability to do: 
choose the Prime Minister and Deputy Minister 
in the case of Labour, choose the Cabinet 
choose the leader of the Opposition 
Despite having such important constitutional roles, political parties are 
controlled by elites:33 
Effective control of political parties is in the hands of a few people, and 
these few are not generally accountable to the membership of the party 
at large, let alone the general public. The membership could be in control 
if it exerted itself and came to meetings. 
Mulgan has noted that "[p]olitical parties and the competition between them 
are an aid, not a hindrance, to democracy ... "34 
Previous Periods of Coalition Government 
Coalition government, if it eventuates under MMP, will be a new experience 
for modern New Zealanders. It is not, however, a new phenomenon for New 
Zealand. Wood has observed there have already been several periods of 
coalition government:35 
Above n 31, 132. 
Above n 31, 133. 
34 R Mulgan Democracy and Power in New Zealand (2ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1989) 58. Quoted in above n 31, 129. 
35 A Wood "The Origins of the First National Government: A Study in New Zealand 
Wartime Politics, 1914-15" (MA Research Paper, University of Canterbury, 1963) 219. 
36 
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Since the advent of modern party politics, there have
 been three 
coalitions in New Zealand, in 1915-19, 1931-35 and in 19
42. Each has 
been born in crisis and racked by internal disagreemen
ts. Both war 
coalitions have been abandoned by the Opposition a
t the earliest 
opportunity - though in the case of the first this did not com
e until 1919 -
while the depression coalition was defeated and discredited
 in 1935. 
Considered in this light, New Zealand has experienced coa
lition government 
in rare and only negative circumstances. A recent except
ion has been the 
short-term coalition between the governing National Party a
nd the tiny Right 
of Centre Party. In this instance, the minority party leader w
as a member of 
the executive outside of cabinet. While unusual in New Z
ealand, coalition 
government is relatively common internationally. In 
most European 
countries, for instance, coalition governments have been
 the norm rather 
than the exception. 36 
Although the advent of strong parties creates the possibilit
y of manipulation 
of parliament by non-elected bodies, parties have mad
e governing and 
legislating more secure for majority governments. In fact, 
without parties it 
would be difficult to describe any government as having a m
ajority:37 
Chapman makes the very good point that the gift of party t
o governments 
was stability of support by MPs. "Party's gift to the e
lectorate was 
meaningful choice between alternative governments wh
ose proposals 
were known." 
III ELECTIVE DICTATORSHIPS 
A FPP Duopoly 
Hailsham observes that in the elective dictatorship, two maj
or parties tend to 
alternate in government.38 Each governs, despite pe
rhaps a slender 
majority, in such a way as to reverse the policy directions o
f its predecessor. 
Above n 4, 3. 
37 R Chapman "Political Culture: the Purpose of Party and the Current Cha
llenge" in H 
Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in Perspective (2ed, Longm
an Paul, Auckland, 1989) 14. 
Cited in above n 31, 130. 
38 Above n 6, 21. 
l 
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First Past the Post (FPP) elections are conducted in separate regional 
electorates. In each electorate, the votes for each candidate are counted 
and a single winner declared. Since 1935, this method of electing members 
to Parliament has resulted in a virtual duopoly by the National and Labour 
parties. Smaller parties occasionally polled well in particular electorates and 
on rare occasions won a seat in Parliament. However, even when a small 
party built up a solid following across the whole country, it would not result in 
representation in the House unless the numbers could be so concentrated 
into a single electorate to result in an election night victory for the local 
candidate. As this was a rare event, the two main parties could confidently 
dissuade voters from supporting 'third' and 'fourth' parties by observing that 
such votes would be 'wasted'. Despite this sense of 'waste', despite the 
rarity of a third party winning an electorate seat, and despite the unlikelihood 
of a third party gaining sufficient individual seats to form a majority 
government, a noticeable number of voters nevertheless gave their support 
to smaller parties. 
B Elective Dictatorship 
FPP cabinets have been criticised for being an elective dictatorship 
supported by only a minority of voters.39 Palmer has commented:40 
Both main political parties in New Zealand can gain only minority support 
at election time. Yet under the "winner take all" system one or other of 
them forms the government, and with a parliamentary majority which may 
be small they have the total running of the government. All other interests 
are shut out of it. 
C Dishonouring Pre-election Promises 
New Zealand is emerging from a decade of radical social and economic 
revolution in which successive governments have enacted legislation 
bearing scant relationship to election promises. "A trend is developing in 
New Zealand politics. There is an increasing divergence between the agreed , _ ___ _ 
39 M Varnham "Vote PR for More Women on the Hill" in A McRobie (ed) Taking it to the 
People?: The New Zealand Electoral Referendum Debate (Hazard Press, Christchurch, 1993) 
149. 
40 Above n 31,195. 
41 
42 
43 
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policy of the political parties at election time and their performance in 
office."41 
"It is noteworthy that the Manifesto for the 1987 election had not been 
published until after the elections were over. "42 Political parties have 
abandoned manifestos once in office, and some MPs for reasons of 
conscience have even abandoned their parties to form new ones. Palmer 
has commented:43 
The traditional understanding in New Zealand has been that parties give 
a solemn undertaking to follow their manifestos. This undertaking 
amounted virtually to a constitutional convention ; the electors expected 
governments to follow their party manifestos ... That used to be the 
system, but is now disintegrating ... Manifestos under proportional 
representation would in some instances become a starting point for 
negotiation not a prescription for action . That is what they should be 
anyway. The idea that a party can govern in modern conditions on the 
basis of a manifesto drawn up in the way New Zealand manifestos are 
drawn up is manifestly absurd. It is even more absurd to anyone who has 
a close knowledge of how party policy is actually made. 
If this is the case, the role of members of Parliament, and indeed the role of 
political parties, moves significantly from the 'delegate' model where the 
party is an agent of the people's will, and more towards the 'representative' 
model where the party, while still conforming to known principles, has 
freedom to negotiate and adapt to changing conditions while in office. 
N ELECTORAL ACT 1993 
A Provision for Parties 
One of the most significant innovations of the Electoral Act 1993 is the 
statutory recognition it gives to political parties. The Act focuses the main 
aspects of the electoral process on political parties and their proportional 
representation in the House of Representatives. In this way, the Act 
Above n 31, 143. 
Above n 31,144,145. 
Above n 31 , 196-197. 
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significantly develops the position of parties within the constitutional system. 
However, proportional representation is not a new concept to New Zealand 
political life. In 1912, the Reform Government considered introducing a 
system of proportional representation to ensure fair representation but the 
proposal was defeated in caucus by country members who feared for their 
own quota. 44 
Part IV provides for the Registration of political parties. Section 150 provides 
that ballot papers shall have two parts, enabling the elector to vote for both a 
constituency candidate as well as a party. Where the constituency candidate 
belongs to a party, that party's name appears below the candidate's name. 
Under the original Electoral Act 1956, candidates' names stood alone on the 
ballot paper without any mention of their parties. Subsection 192 (1) 
provides the key mechanism of the MMP system, assigning seats to parties 
according to an arithmetic ranking formula described in section 191 . 
Not all parties are eligible for the proportional allocation of seats. In 
particular, it provides that parties must: 
1 . Be registered with the Electoral Commission 45 
2. Have 500 current financial members46 
3. Receive at least five per cent of the party votes at the election or 
win a constituency seat.47 
B Proportional Representation 
A key implication of proportional representation is the threat it poses to the 
traditional dominance of the two major parties. In the past, by voting either 
for Labour or National, voters not only elected members to the House of 
Representatives but also, in effect, elected the Government. Where three or 
more parties are likely to be significantly represented in the House, as under 
the MMP system, voters still elect members and parties to the House but 
there is less of a sense of electing a specific government. Unless one party 
wins an absolute majority of seats, the composition of the government will 
be determined by negotiation between party leaders and possibly parliament 
Above n 35, 77. 
The Electoral Act 1993, s 62. 
Above n 45, s 63(2)(c)(v) . 
Above n 45, s 191 . 
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and the Governor-General. Thus, no party can confidently make pre-election 
promises based on the supposition that it, or indeed any party, will govern in 
its own right following the return of the writs. 
C Lack of Mandate 
A coalition government is a "temporary combination of parties".48 Unlike 
incoming FPP governments which have claimed to have a clear mandate 
from the electorate, a coalition government contains partners who have 
received different (even conflicting) mandates. These separate mandates 
are still important.49 The point to be made here, however, is that the 
electorate has the opportunity to endorse coalition policies if the coalition 
announces itself and its agreed policies before a general election. In 
Germany, coalitions are announced before the election so that voters know 
what they are voting for. 50 
If the policy negotiation only occurs after the writs have been returned, then 
the coalition partners themselves alone provide the mandate for the policies. 
The electors are in a sense left out of the equation while their elected 
representatives mutually determine what weight should be given to disparate 
party election manifestos and individual pledges. Even when parties decide 
these issues before an election, electors are unlikely to be consulted. 
Electoral reform may have been driven by the sense of powerlessness 
which electors felt towards their elected governments. Governments, and 
more particularly cabinets, have at times legitimately made use of their 
virtually unlimited powers - through executive fiat or domination of 
parliament - to impose new policy directions on an unsuspecting public. On 
occasion, announcements have not been legitimate.51 Mulgan suggests that 
politicians themselves have become casualties of their own behaviour:
52 
Above n 2, 427. 
49 See above n 34, 58. "To break a commitment is to break faith with those voters who 
chose to vote for the party for that reason." 
50 J Wallace "MMP - the Royal Commission's Preferred Option" in A McRobie (ed) 
Taking it to the People?: The New Zealand Electoral Referendum Debate (Hazard Press, 
Christchurch, 1993) 176. 
51 Fitzgeraldv. Muldoon (1976] 2 NZLR 615 (Supreme Court). 
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The radical reforms of the last eight years were made by politicians who 
had little or no mandate for them and rammed them through the system 
with all the resources of the elective dictatorship. But one undoubted cost 
of the Rogernomics revolution was the discrediting of politicians as 
dishonest and the electoral process a sham. Whatever politicians may 
say on the hustings and whatever choices voters may express, real 
power appears to be in the hands of an unaccountable elite. 
D A venues to Power 
The Electoral Act 1993 establishes an electoral system that provides two 
clear avenues whereby smaller parties can more surely secure seats in 
Parliament: 
1 In reaching the five per cent threshold for parties, qualifying for five 
per cent or more of the 120 seats in Parliament53 
2 By winning one of the 60 General Electorates, qualifying for a 
proportion of the seats in Parliament approximately equal to its share of the 
Party Vote.54 
The likely increase in the number of parties represented in Parliament will 
entail a related decrease in the percentage of seats available to the two 
traditional parties, National and Labour, which have dominated the New 
Zealand Parliament for 50 years until 1985 when "frenetic parliamentary 
activity and change" brought about significant change.55 In the two years 
preceding the first MMP election, the number of parties with seats in 
Parliament grew. The main reason was that members resigned from the two 
main parties and formed or joined other smaller parties. In 1995, nine parties 
held seats in the House. One party, United New Zealand, was formed in 
1995 and drew its members from three other parties represented in the 
House. 56 Despite the proliferation of parties preceding the first MMP 
election, the five per cent threshold will ensure that very few of them hold 
seats after the election. In fact, the results of one opinion poll in September 
Above n 45, s 191. 
Above n 45, s 191. 
55 D McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1994) 6. 
56 National, Labour, Future New Zealand. 
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1995 indicated that only four parties would qualify for seats from the party 
list allocation.57 
E End of Duopoly 
Whether the number of parties is three, four or five, their presence in the 
House will be significant. Even a small party which wins just five per cent of 
the party vote will hold at least six seats. In this way, the Act spells the end 
of the traditional Labour-National duopoly. Boston suggests that it is 
improbable that any one party will be able to secure a majority of seats 
without at least 46-47 per cent of the list vote.58 "In New Zealand, parties do 
not often win such high levels of electoral support ... " Indeed, no party has 
won more than 50 per cent of the vote since 1951. Certain constitutional 
factors favour the formation of minority governments: there is no 
requirement for the government to hold a majority of seats in the House or to 
face a vote of confidence. 
57 See "Backing tor National up - poll" Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 13 
September 1995, 1. 
58 Above n 4, 3. 
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IV CABINET 
Cabinet is the key decision making body of government in New Zealand. It is 
the grouping of responsible ministers who together constitute the Executive. 
For half a century, New Zealand has had single party cabinets. If coalition 
government eventuates under MMP, then it is this tradition of cabinet which 
will end. While parliament is already accustomed to several parties sharing 
the chamber, and individual party caucuses will continue to meet separately, 
it is cabinet as a body which stands to undergo the greatest constitutional 
change. Coalition government places more than a single party round the 
cabinet table. 
I CABINET 
Palmer has noted that Cabinet is a creature of constitutional convention that 
has been largely ignored by traditional constitutional law.59 He has also 
described cabinet as the "elective dictatorship".60 Cabinet is not a legally 
created body and there is no formal.procedure for appointment to it. Instead, 
parliamentary parties conduct the appojntment process themselves.61 
Mcleay claims that the only formal constraint on its power is the triennial 
general election.62 A British cabinet minister has noted: 
"If it has any such existence at all, it is an informal committee of the Privy 
Council."63 Its constitutional significance is major. Mulgan describes Cabinet 
Above n 31, 106. lCf{'}I" U1 U-UWl 
N McMillan Top of the Greasy Pole : New Zealand's Prime Ministers of Recent Times 
"1clndoe, Dunedin, 1993) 31. 
1 E Mcleay The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
Auc~and, 1995) 17. 
62 Above n 61, 6. 
3 Lord Hailsham A Sparrow's Flight: The Memoirs of Lord Hai/sham of Marylebone 
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as "the apex of New Zealand's system of responsible party government".64 It 
has authority over the agencies of government through direct executive 
decisions "or through legislative enactment passed by the Parliament whose 
agenda it controls". Cabinet, "the vital pivot of the entire government 
system"65 , the "cockpit of the decision-making system",
66 is effectively 
created by the Prime Minister who advises the Governor General. 
II PRIME MINISTER 
Despite the increase in the number of parties at the cabinet table, coalition 
governments, like those of FPP, rely on a single individual to hold the post of 
Prime Minister. The Prime Minister may not necessarily be the leader of any 
individual party. Where the Prime Minster commands such support by virtue 
of coalition, the Prime Minister is left accountable to coalition partners on an 
almost daily basis. Rather than having a free hand in choosing the cabinet, a 
coalition Prime Minister will consult with the partners "building on the 
principles and conventions" already established for single-party majority 
governments. 67 
A Determining the Prime Minister 
Palmer has noted that the role of Prime Minister is not established in law but 
according to convention.68 McGee describes the Prime Minister as "the 
member of the House who commands majority support from the other 
members". While majority support could in the past be presumed in the case 
of a member whose party alone held a majority of the seats in the House, no 
such automatic presumption can be made concerning the support of 
members of Party A for the leader of Party B in a proposed coalition prior to 
the first sitting of the House. Parliamentary support for the appointment of 
the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Crown is not formally tested. 
McGee says there is no legal or political necessity for this to be ratified or 
Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland
, 1994) 64 
69. 
65 Mai Chen and Sir Geoffrey Palmer Public Law in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press. Auckland, 1993) 217. 
66 Geoffrey Palmer Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution 
and Government (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1979) 10. 
67 Above n 64, 72. 
68 Above n 60, 80. 
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confirmed by the House when it meets.69 "But, whatever the precise 
arrangements, it is the political situation as represented by the members 
elected to serve in the House which determines who is to govern, not the 
whim or pleasure of the Crown." 
B Appointment of Prime Minister 
"Convention dictates that the leader of the party with the support of the 
House is chosen as Prime Minister, although the Governor-General is not 
bound to follow anyone's advice on this matter. "70 This important convention 
does not account for numerous variations that are possible through 
coalitions. The obvious example is where no one party has the .support of 
the House. Following inter-party negotiation after an MMP election, it may be 
a coalition of parties - rather than a single party - which commands the 
support of the House. Further, within such a coalition of parties, the Prime 
Minister is likely to be the leader of the party with the most members in 
Parliament. Mulgan comments that "[u]nder a coalition government, the 
largest party in the coalition partnership will usually provide the prime 
minister who will negotiate with other party leaders about the Cabinet 
membership". Considering the constitutional significance of cabinet to the 
governance of New Zealand, it is noteworthy that very few conventions exist 
concerning how a Prime Minister should go about forming a cabinet in a 
coalition context. This is especially so when examining issues of 
accountability in relation to coalition government. 
C Public Role of Prime Minister 
Although Cabinet is a committee and operates within the convention of 
collective responsibility, its decisions and views are, by tradition, presented 
publicly by the Prime Minister. Just as Prime Ministers in FPP governments 
have come to represent their administrations, Prime Ministers in coalition 
governments shoulder an important responsibility in presenting an image of 
unity and cohesion. If any one individual can be held accountable for the 
performance of a coalition government, it is the Prime Minister. Just as FPP 
Prime Ministers, assisted by the convention of collective responsibility, are 
able to disguise disunity in Cabinet when it is rumoured to exist, coalition 
Above n 55, 3. 
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Prime Ministers have the challenge of articulating decisions reached 
between ministers with affiliations to parties elected on different manifestos. 
Many of the observations that have been made about the unifying role of the 
Prime Minister in a FPP cabinet, particularly regarding the relationship 
between the Prime Minister and the other ministers, could be applied to 
partners in a coalition cabinet. Mulgan has commented:71 
In political reality, ministers do not act independently but as members of a 
team under a single leader, the prime minister, who acts as coordinator 
and spokesperson of their collective effort. Reasons of electoral survival 
encourage what good administrative practice would independently 
recommend, that ministers, as members of a common enterprise, should 
stand or fall together and seek to submerge their differences within a 
collective body to which they all defer. 
D Chairing Cabinet 
The Prime Minister, more than any other individual, has the onus of 
maintaining the coalition. As formal votes are rarely taken at cabinet, the 
personal judgement of the prime minister is the vital factor in establishing the 
result of discussions. If formal votes were taken to resolve issues, then 
powerful factions within cabinet would always dominate. When the prime 
minister has the prerogative to summarise and decide issues, then the case 
for the minority can sometimes be favoured. This prerogative is of greater 
value in the case of a coalition cabinet where the views of the minor partner 
can easily be overshadowed due to force of numbers. Cohesion and 
teamwork in cabinet are essential to effective government.72 There is no 
formula or set of rules by which this is achieved. However, the success of 
coalition cabinets may depend on the judgement and management skills of 
the prime minister. 
Single party cabinets also depended on the leader's ability to listen, consult, 
motivate and unify colleagues. Sir Keith Holyoake, a prime minister in the 
FPP era, was a "consensus politician" by virtue of involving others in the 
decision-making process.73 Significantly for a consensus politician, he also 
Above n 64, 70. 
Above n 60, 21. 
Above n 60, 14. 
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believed that "an ounce of loyalty to a leader was worth a ton of 
intelligence" .74 Ministers of minority parties in cabinet will discover that 
consultation and accountability is a two-way process; in return for being 
consulted, they will be expected to display as much loyalty to the prime 
minister as do other ministers. 
E Coalition Agreements 
Just as the coalition agreement and its various elements are important for 
the health of the coalition partners, they are also important for the 
information of the voting public. If the public are kept ignorant of vital 
undertakings made by coalition partners to each other, either in terms of 
policy or legislative programme, then the government becomes even less 
accountable. The electorate is ignorant of the basis on which the elected are 
governing. 
Cabinet Unity 
Agreements are important not only for establishing the policy directions of 
government but also for reasons of political management. Past New Zealand 
coalitions point to the need for a shared philosophy. On 12 July 1917 Findlay 
observed that rumour persistently suggested that the Cabinet lacked the 
"strenuous cohesion and co-operation essential to unity of purpose and 
effort". He quoted Burke to the effect that "a Cabinet composed of isolated 
individuals, without faith, plighted tie, or common principle, is an 
Administration constitutionally impotent". 75 
F Official Information 
The 'Danks' Committee Report on Official Information which contributed 
towards the development of the Official Information Act 1982 did not extend 
to information generated and held by Parliament.76 It did, however, 
enunciate important principles which it expected would be applied to 
Parliament and other bodies in due course, and which are relevant to a 
discussion of accountability. The arguments for increased openness in 
Above n 60, 90. 
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government centred on participation, accountability and effective 
government: 
1 Participation 
The principle that a better informed public is better able to play the part 
required of it in the democratic system - and to judge policies and electoral 
platforms; 
2 Accountability 
Access to official information is an essential factor in making sure that 
politicians and administrators are accountable for their actions. Secrecy is 
an impediment to accountability and breeds suspicion. The pressure for 
accountability applies increasingly to the political executive. 
3 Effective government 
Not all the government's decisions are foreshadowed in election platforms. 
Change requires public understanding and agreement. 
Coalition Agreements and Programmes 
If such matters were concealed, the government of the country would be in 
the hands of a political entity which was not itself registered with the 
Electoral Commission and which has no known policy of its own distinct from 
the separate policies of its constituent parties. There will always be political 
reasons for concealing agreements between parties. However, two key 
statements from the Danks Report bear quoting: 
Nowadays it is generally recognised that the Government has a 
responsibility to keep the people informed of its activities and make clear 
the reasons for its decisions.77 
The fact that the release of certain information may give rise to criticism 
or embarrassment of the government is not an adequate reason for 
withholding it from the public.78 
Above n 76, 5. 
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The summary of the Report commented:79 
The case for more openness in government is compelling. It rests on 
democratic participation in public affairs, on accountability, on a concern 
for the interests of individuals, and on the effectiveness of government. 
In the MMP era, information about coalitions, the reasons for them and the 
undertakings given to each other by partners, will be essential to evaluating 
government policy. In this regard, much will depend on the ability of the 
Prime Minister of a coalition government in articulating the goals and policies 
of the government and in establishing the cohesion required to sustain the 
coalition. 
MINISTERS 
Executive Councillor's Oath 
I Cabinet and the Executive Council are two distinct bodies. Mcleay has 
noted that although the memberships of the two tends to be the same, they 
have different functions: Cabinet decides policy while the Executive Council 
I 
tenders advice to the Governor-General when the law requires advice to be 
tendered in this way.so 
I The Executive Councillor's Oath inter alia provides that:81 
• 
!. .. will to the best of my judgment...freely give my counsel and advice to 
the Governor-General. .. for the good management of the affairs of New 
Zealand. That I will not directly nor indirectly reveal such matters as shall 
be debated in Council and committed to my secrecy, but that I will in all 
things be a true and faithful Councillor. So help me God . 
The Oath focuses on values of a national kind that transcend party 
• differences between Councillors. A unifying object is "the good management 
of New Zealand". The requirement for secrecy contributes to the unity of the 
Council. 
Above n 76, 39. 
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B Instability As An Instrument Of Accountability 
1 Secure Majority 
A criticism of some FPP governments has been the dictatorial style of the 
Executive. Such a style is dependent on having an automatic majority in the 
House. A minority government, whether single party or coalition, does not 
possess an automatic majority and can proceed with its legislative 
programme only with the negotiated support of opposition parties. In 
circumstances where the Opposition parties collectively have the power to 
vote governments down, instability is the voice of parliamentary 
accountability. Lost divisions in the House potentially amount to a failure of 
the coalition to enact legislation that is central to the coalition agreement 
reached between the partners at the time of the formation of the coalition. As 
a voted-down government will not be able to honour its coalition 
commitments, the lack of stability results in a diminution of accountability. In 
the MMP era, government parties may have to accept the fact that not all 
divisions are winnable. 'Ending the coalition' will become a legitimate action 
but Ministers who do so should justify their action against the terms of the 
coalition agreement. In the New Zealand House of Representatives, too 
much is left to individual responsibility. In contrast, Sweden requires an 
absolute majority of all MPs to defeat a government.82 Other nations require 
'constructive' votes of no-confidence whereby an alternative government is 
named as part of the motion. 
2 Powers of the Executive 
Hailsham, in discussing the Executive in the context of elective dictatorship, 
draws a clear distinction between executive government and the right to 
legislate, affirming that "[g]eneral legislature should be representative of 
public opinion."83 He notes that executive government carries with it the right 
to financial and economic control and control of the Civil Service. "These 
should depend on the majority in the Commons." Hailsham comments that 
given these rights, the government should not also have the right of 
unlimited powers to change the law. He does not at this point consider the 
possibility of minority government; but if he is acknowledging that a 
Above n 13, 72. 
Above n 6, 151 . 
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government requires a working majority and there are too many parties for 
any one to govern in its own right, then coalition government - or at least 
minority government coupled with strong inter-party agreements on 
confidence and supply - would seem the only alternative. 
Hailsham's point is applicable, nonetheless, to either a single-party or a 
coalition cabinet. If, under constitutional arrangements, they both assume 
the right to unlimited power to legislate then both can be said to suffer from 
the same malaise of elective dictatorship. An important quality of coalition 
government in countering such dictatorship tendencies is the mere fact of its 
mixed composition. With more than one party present in cabinet, there is 
greater political pressure on individual parties to withdraw in protest. 
Hailsham does note the 'see-saw' tendency of opposing parties, usually the 
two major ones, to alternatively undo their predecessor's work once in 
cabinet. Coalition government does offer the opportunity to break this cycle 
by including in cabinet parties with different perspectives on the 
predecessor's programme. It is also possible that one or more coalition 
partners may have been members of the previous government. In this light, 
one implication of a coalition is a lessening of the temptation to alter what 
has gone before. 
3 Need for New Conventions 
Mulgan predicts that in terms of selecting ministers, "procedures will be 
gradually developed among New Zealand parties, building on the principles 
and conventions devised for dealing with single -party majority 
governments •. s4 Judging by the protracted and inconclusive coalition 
discussions that surrounded the Alliance and Labour parties during the 
course of 1995, the need for guidelines, principles, conventions and indeed 
experience of establishing coalition governments is real. However, this may 
not necessarily be the case. Such conventions will be acquired over time. 
Certainly, the conventions of the two major parties as they stand in 1995 
appear set to create conflict if they entered into a grand coalition with each 
other. An example is the different mechanisms employed by the parties to 
select members of Cabinet. Whereas it is the responsibility of the National 
prime minister to personally select ministers from within the caucus, under 
Above n 64, 71 -72. 
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Labour party rules it is caucus which determines which members will 
become ministers. 
C Cabinet Size 
Cabinet size is the first vital element for a coalition Prime Minister to 
determine: whether to establish a minimum winning cabinet with just a single 
partner, or to form a maximum winning cabinet that includes more partners 
than are essential in order to ensure a parliamentary majority. A smaller 
cabinet is not necessarily weaker if the partners are willing to vote together 
on a broad range of issues; a larger coalition cabinet might have the 
numbers on issues of confidence and supply yet be divided on a broad 
range of issues. Creating viable, accountable cabinets containing members 
not of ones own party will be one of the great constitutional challenges of 
political management in the coming era. 
Assignment of Portfolios 
For a coalition, some appointments are to be understood in terms of 
maintaining knowledge of a partner's behaviour. Therefore, for reasons of 
monitoring and accountability, associate and deputy minister roles could be 
allocated to parties not holding the portfolio responsibility.85 Denmark 
employs a system of 'contact ministers' where each minister has a 'shadow' 
from the other partner to monitor and discuss contentious issues. Serious 
problems are referred to a cabinet committee.86 
D Collective Responsibility 
Decisions at cabinet are usually reached by consensus rather than by vote. 
Despite this apparently relaxed method of reaching a decision, the 
implications for all ministers are severe.87 
Once a decision has been made, however, it is to be supported 
collectively by all Ministers, regardless of their personal views and 
whether or not they were at the meeting concerned. 
85 Mackie T and Hagwood B (eds) Unlocking the Cabinet: Cabinet Structures in 
Comparative Perspective (Sage, London, 1985). Quoted by in n 4, 9. 
86 See J Boston "Electoral Reform in New Zealand", Australian Quarterly 66, 3 Spring 
1994, 85. 
87 Above n 70, Chapter 3, A4. 
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The convention of collective responsibility is:88 
... an essential underpinning of the system of Cabinet Government, 
whereby Ministers are required to advise the Sovereign (in practice, the 
Governor-General) on matters of public importance. Ministers whose 
opposition to a Cabinet decision is such that they wish to publicly 
dissociate themselves from it must first resign from the Cabinet. 
Palmer has called the doctrine of collective responsibility "one of the key 
elements of cabinet government and it has important consequences for the 
way the system works".89 The sense of unanimity serves to promote the 
appearance of cabinet unity; avoids confusion about the government's 
policy; enables people to know who are responsible and to hold them 
accountable. 
Every minister must be prepared to defend every government policy - that 
advances the value of cohesion and purposefulness ... The doctrine of 
collective responsibility is the quintessential ingredient of the adversary 
approach to politics generated by the Westminster system. There can 
only be one view in the government itself and all the members of cabinet 
must defend it. The principle goes further. Those who hold office as 
ministers or under-secretaries outside cabinet are also bound by the 
doctrine, despite the fact that they have no voice in making the cabinet 
decision." 
Some scholars question the durability of the convention of collective 
responsibility.90 Although coalition cabinets will contain 'strange bedfellows', 
the potential for disagreement is not necessarily greater than with FPP 
cabinets, and the principle of collective responsibility may be even more 
useful for all concerned.91 
The doctrine of collective responsibility is better understood and has 
generally only been experienced in a context of single party cabinets. As 
I Above n 70, Chapter 3, A5. 
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coalition cabinets are relatively unknown in New Zealand, it is speculative to 
comment on the applicability of the doctrine of collective responsibility. 
Hailsham believes the doctrine can only survive under single party 
government; coalition cabinets, already burdened with normal operating 
pressures, involve too many logistical problems in keeping "junior ministers 
and influential backbenchers" in touch.92 Coalition cabinets, in his view ' 
would become "like any other committee of which the membership is mixed 
and responsible to different caucuses". 
E Termination Of Coalition 
The termination of a coalition is also important in terms of accountability. 
One partner is always accountable to the other for its behaviour in 
government. Each partner maintains accountability with its own principles as 
well as the electorate by reserving the right to leave the coalition when its 
performance is detrimental to basic principles. 
Hailsham maintains that one of the means the elective dictatorship employs 
to perpetuate itself, to prolong its life, is through "the adroit use of the power 
of dissolution".93 Hailsham contends that the prerogative of dissolution in the 
hands of a skilful prime minister actually establishes the elective 
dictatorship.94 If the power of a prime minister to dissolve parliament is seen 
to be a threat to accountability in the broad sense, then coalition government 
offers a diffusion of that power. Under a coalition, any partner whose 
membership is essential to sustain a majority in the House, is able to 
collapse the government by withdrawing from the coalition. 
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V CAUCUS 
I CAUCUS AND THE COALITION CABINET 
A Caucus 
Caucus, the regular meeting of all the members of a parliamentary party, is 
an important grouping that constitutes a vital stage of the process by which 
the Executive has traditionally controlled Parliament. Caucus decisions have 
been dominated by cabinet due to cabinet's effective voting majority in 
caucus. Caucus decisions are binding on members. As the government 
caucus traditionally holds a majority in the House, caucus decisions have 
effectively pre-determined the outcome of proposed legislation. 
The Government caucus is a "sounding board" for policy developed within 
Cabinet.95 Proportional Representation will see several strongly represented 
parties in the House. Each one will hold its own caucus. Forming temporary 
voting coalitions is not impossible in these circumstances, but to achieve 
agreements outside of the House will demand greater levels of liaison 
between caucuses than was evident under FPP. Coalitions last when 
partners .vote as a bloc in Parliament, but recent events suggest politics is 
becoming less sectarian and the age of lobby-fodder MPs is under threat.96 
However, while every meeting of a coalition cabinet fosters a sense of 
working with other parties, every meeting of separate caucuses fosters a 
sense of sectarian politics. To develop caucus accountability to coalition 
commitments, a new practice of combined caucuses could be developed. 
Caucus and MMP 
•
15 Above n 31 , 162. 
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The Electoral Act 1993 presents a challenge to the nature, objectives and 
operations not just of the government caucus but in fact every caucus within 
the House of Representatives. With the likely decline of single party 
domination of parliament, New Zealand enters an era where parliament as a 
collective of its constituent parties and individual members has a clearly 
enhanced power to determine legislation. In such an environment, deprived 
of a guaranteed majority, a minority government caucus will be unable to 
predetermine the result of divisions in the House. The government caucus 
will spend more time in preparing arguments to be used in debates, and in 
determining alliances with other parties, that are critical to achieving 
necessary majorities for various bills. Instead of being a 'rubber stamping' 
mechanism for cabinet proposals, the government caucus will be a forum for 
debate about content of bills and inter-party voting strategies. Voting 
strategies developed between different party caucuses are brief working 
coalitions that represent accountability by virtue of the dialogue that takes 
place between parties. 
C Ministers in Caucus 
Coalition ministers will not be able to dominate their respective caucuses to 
the degree which government ministers have in the past. For one reason, 
they may be outnumbers by backbenchers. Backbenchers will see caucus 
as a crucial time to influence their own ministers and draw them back to 
party principles. For political reasons, backbenchers - and parties 
themselves - may prefer to stick to their publicly-known principles than 'sell 
out' to compromises made in the coalition Cabinet. The stability of 
governments wil! depend on caucus support for the coalition agreement. In 
fact, a coalition is ineffective unless constituent parties can be relied upon to 
vote together in Parliament. 
While there will be pressure on its members to conform to whipping 
requirements, the new arrangement will also give caucus a new power over 
Cabinet. One of the tensions that arises in the MMP era is on the issue of to 
whom members should be accountable when it comes to voting in the 
house. The Burkean principle suggests members should think for 
themselves and decide the best way to vote. In possible conflict with this is 
the pressure, expressed in either party rules or pledges, to vote with the 
party caucus in the House. There have been times in the recent past when 
members of Parliament have withdrawn from the parliamentary party on 
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matters of principle where they have felt their caucus had unacceptably 
departed from party principles. Similar pressures will occur for caucus 
members when their parties form coalitions with other parties. 
D Bloc voting 
Bills, even bills that have been developed through consultation between 
coalition partners, have reduced chance of enactment if the partners do not 
vote as a bloc in Parliament. If coalition government either is unable to 
tightly whip its members in the House, or if the MMP environment permits 
free voting amongst MPs, then no government, certainly no coalition 
government, can be held accountable for the success or failure of specific 
legislation in the House. Election promises and manifestos are reduced to 
wish lists with no guarantee of enactment. In 1995, the leader of the Alliance 
Party asked the Labour Party leader for an assurance that she could "deliver 
her caucus" if there was a coalition deal between the two parties prior to the 
next election.97 "Ms Clark has replied all caucus decisions are binding on all 
MPs on matters of policy." 
At best, parties can offer directions and ambitions and their performance can 
be measured not by legislative achievement but by the degree of effort and 
negotiation applied to specific policies. In determining the degree of 
responsibility for legislative performance, the electorate will assess the effort 
and the voting patterns of each coalition partner. In this way, one particular 
partner may be credited with the success or failure of a bill. The 
transparency of the voting process in the House enables the public to 
assess party position and responsibility for each piece of legislation. This 
method is the clearest way in which coalition partners can be individually 
assessed by the electorate. While it is in the interests of a coalition to 
maintain collective strength in the House, there will always be a political 
need to demonstrate in what ways the partners differ as parties, particularly 
in the lead-up to a general election. 
E Party/Caucus 
One politician contends that MPs' freedom may be more constrained in the 
MMP environment. "The essential thing about MMP is that it is government 
See "Alliance walking away from talks with Labour" Sunday Star-Times, Wellington, 
, ,cw Zealand, 6 August 1995, A4. 
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by party. There will be very much less room for individual MPs to have their 
say."98 
By definition, a caucus is a meeting of members of the one party. It is the 
principal forum in which the extra-parliamentary party can influence and 
control the parliamentary party. Hailsham has noted that the FPP system 
was more likely than any other to produce domination by an organised 
minority.99 This was achieved through biased, and sometimes corrupt, 
selection committees. He therefore questions how representativeness of the 
British system of government. Palmer has questioned the de~ree of 
membership involvement in policy-making in political party organisations in 
New Zealand. Much of the policy and selection work is undertaken by a 
small minority within the party. Therefore, if a member of Parliament is to be 
accountable to the party, the first point to clarify is the meaning and identity 
of the party: elite minority or broad but absent majority. Hailsham notes that 
"party organisations in the House determine in practice the result of almost 
every division". 100 
F Political Accountability 
Under coalition government, caucuses will have enhanced power simply 
because the number of backbenchers will more than likely be greater than 
the number of ministers. This is due to the fact that the full quota of 
ministers, rather than dominating a single caucus, will be spread over two or 
three separate caucuses. Ministers will no longer be able to use force of 
numbers in caucus to compel caucus to adopt cabinet policies . Some 
degree of compliance will occur simply from personal responsibi!ity by 
members. A further pressure is likely to come from parties themselves. The 
National Party is already asking candidates for the next election to sign 
pledges prior to selection. 
Under the concept of political accountability a governing party is expected to 
deliver on its election promises. Hailsham observes the danger when "a 
government elected by a small minority of votes ... regards itself as 
entitled ... to carry out every proposal in its election manifesto. "
101 The 
98 See comments of Jonathan Hunt in "The Reality of MMP" The Evening Post, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 12 July 1995, 9. 
99 Above n 6, 102. 
100 Above n 6, 127. 
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concept of constitutional accountability in the era of MMP may require 
parties not to do so . 
102 
103 
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VI PARLIAMENT 
I PARLIAMENT 
Under the Constitution Act, Parliament consists of the Sovereign in right of 
New Zealand and the House of Representatives. 102 It has full power to 
make laws.103 The New Zealand parliament has few limits on its legislative 
powers. It is almost unique in this sovereignty. 104 McGee notes that it shares 
its legislative role and "the finding of a government" with the Crown.105 
Oath of Allegiance 
A person elected to represent an electoral district or a political party is 
required to take the Oath of Allegiance before taking his or her seat in 
Parliament. Section 17 of the Oaths and Declarations Act 1957 provides the 
words of the Oath: 
I, ,swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to 
Her ... Majesty ... Queen Elizabeth the Second ... Her ... heirs and 
. successors, according to law. So help me God. 
The Oath is simple. It is a unifying feature for the members of Parliament in 
the sense that it is one major commitment that all members have made. The 
Oath reflects New Zealand's status as a constitutional monarchy. The Oath 
does bond all members in a shared allegiance to the one person who 
symbolises the New Zealand state. 
The Constitution Act 1986, s 14( 1). 
Above n 102, s 15(1 ), 
Above n 6, 135. 
Above n 55, 2. 
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A person may be a member of the Executive Council or as a Minister "only if 
that person is a member of Parliament". 106 There is no requirement tor a 
minister to represent a party. Although it is unlikely, an independent member 
of Parliament could hold the balance of power and be included in a coalition 
cabinet. Parliament can be thus viewed as the pool of individuals as much 
as parties from which cabinet draws its members. McGee describes the 
House as "an electoral college which translates the will of the people, as 
expressed at a general election, into a Government composed of a Prime 
Minister and Ministers"_ 10? 
II EFFECT OF ELECTORAL ACT ON PARLIAMENT 
A General 
The Electoral Act 1993 alters the power structures of government in New 
Zealand. The single-party cabinet with a secure majority in the House 
appears to be a threatened species. The majority party not only loses power 
to other parties but it may also have to share seats at the cabinet table with 
other parties in order to command a majority in the House. Due to the 
number of parties, and the size of the MMP parliament, there is no longer a 
guarantee that a particular caucus will always prevail in the House. 
Parliament itself is arguably the only organ of state that stands to gain in 
eminence and power due to the constitutional reorganisation that will 
accompany the arrival of MMP. Constitutionally, Parliament has always been 
the body that produced governments, debated legislation, and scrutinised 
governments. However, in the era of the duopoly of the Labour and National 
parties, the power of Parliament seemed to pale compared to the power of 
the 'elective dictatorship' of single-party government. 
B Increased Number Of Members 
The Electoral Act 1993 will effectively increase the number of members of 
Parliament from 99 to 120. There are some vagaries under MMP that may 
lead to more than 120 members being returned, but there will be at least 21 
more members than in the previous parliament. If this increase in numbers 
had occurred in an FPP parliament, the effect might have been to strengthen 
Above n 102, s 6(1 ). 
Above n 55, 3. 
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the power of the government caucus without necessarily lessening the 
influence the majority party held in the House. The reality under MMP 
I 
however, is that the increased number of members will be proportionally 
spread over all the parties which manage to win list seats. ms 
1 Power to make governments 
It was the tradition of parties abiding by their principles and disciplined voting 
in the House that made the consequences of election night results more 
predictable. By removing the predictability, the illusion of power to determine 
governments is lifted from the electorate. The power to make laws and to 
make governments has always lain with Parliament in its full constitutional 
sense. This simple fact may have been obscured by FPP elections where 
the electorate appeared to have elected a specific government, rather than 
simply a large group of members standing for different parties, on election 
day. Under MMP, with its potential to produce coalitions, the power to make 
governments more obviously resides with Parliament. 
2 Cabinet size relative to parliament 
In 1993, 27 members were appointed to positions within the Executive. 109 
This equated to 27 per cent of the members in the House. If the same 
number of members work as ministers or hold other positions in the 
Executive under MMP, then the percentage will decrease to 23 per cent. 
This fall in percentage has an impact on the relative power of caucus to 
cabinet, and also parliament to government. 
In the case of a minority single party government which held, for example, 
49 seats in the House, the Cabinet would be in a position to just dominate its 
own caucus. It would not, however, have the numbers to dominate 
parliament. The government would require the support of other parties within 
the House on issues of confidence and supply in order to govern effectively. 
There is nothing innately unworkable about such an arrangement, but it 
does restore to parliament a force, an ability to act as a check and a balance 
on the Executive, that was lacking in the era of dominant single party 
governments. If this ability to act as a check and a balance - to in effect 
make the government more accountable - is attributed to having an 
Above n 45, s 191. 
Above n 61, 25. 
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opposition that outnumbers the government, then minority government can 
be viewed as being more accountable than majority government. 
3 Coalitions 
In rare circumstances, it may be possible even under MMP for a single party 
to win an absolute majority of seats in the House. Failing that eventuality, 
the only way for parties to acquire a reliable working majority will be through 
arrangements with other parties and in particular through the formation of 
coalitions. Where two or more parties, or even parties and individual 
members, form coalitions to establish a majority, then the opposition will 
consequently be less capable of limiting and controlling the government. In 
this way, majority government, even of the coalition variety, offers a threat to 
accountability. 
It could be said that the three-year maximum term of Parliament as provided 
for by section 17 of the Constitution Act 1986 establishes a mechanism 
whereby any government, be it minority, majority, single party or coalition, 
can be held accountable by the electorate at a regular general election. 
However, coalition governments will never be specifically held accountable 
by the electorate in the absence of a registered coalition party. Also, along 
with the enhanced power of parliament to make governments comes the 
equally significant power to unmake them. The electorate may not be 
involved in the termination of all coalition governments. Nor does the end of 
a coalition government necessarily result in a general election. Just as in the 
colonial parliament described earlier, parliament may replace a ministry mid-
term with either a single party or a new coalition. 
Just as coalition government is considered more likely under MMP, the early 
termination of governments is also more likely. Coalition governments tend 
to have shorter life-spans than those of single parties. This is not necessarily 
a weakness if it provides a means by which parliament is able to keep the 
executive in check. It ensures accountability. The relevant contrast is with 
. , the FPP era when the triennial election appeared to be the principal restraint 
on executive government. 
II PARLIAMENT MAKES GOVERNMENTS 
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It should be remembered that no matter what type of cabinet is formed, its 
members are always drawn from the members of the House. A coalition 
cabinet might be said to be more accountable than a single party cabinet 
because its constituent parties monitor each other. A coalition cabinet 
reflects the diversity of parliament to a greater degree than a single party 
cabinet is capable. Critical to the question of this type of accountability is 
whether Party B is more effective as a watchdog of Party A through sharing 
the cabinet table, yet constrained by the convention of collective 
responsibility, or whether it would be more effective in the watchdog role by 
being free to scrutinise and question government policy as a relatively 
unfettered member of the opposition. 
III COALITION 
A Wartime Coalitions 
Preceding the First World War, the electorate was accustomed to single 
party government. Disunity in the Cabinet appeared to be proof that coalition 
government was inherently weak. Also, since the coalition had come about 
in the extraordinary circumstances of the War, it was easier for 
commentators to dismiss it as a flawed aberration of the times rather than a 
serious and permanent style of government. Single party government, 
accepted as the political norm, waited in the wings for its inevitable recall to 
the treasury benches. Such a train of logic does not apply within a 
constitutional framework, such as that encompassed by the Electoral Act 
1993, which makes single party majority government most unlikely. While 
single party minority is quite possible, coalition government is "more 
likely". 11 o 
Hailsham notes that wartime coalitions, based upon a substantial agreement 
between the parties, are the product of the parliamentary situation of the 
time; their purpose is to prevent organised opposition in parliament "on 
condition that the majority party does not abuse its position" and that no 
party is entitled to pursue its internal aims in Parliament. 111 The new 
Parliamentary process heralded by the era of MMP demands more 
Above n 52, 145. 
Above n 6, 198. 
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consultation, negotiation, "and ultimately co-operation between various 
political parties". 112 
B Freer Debates 
As pressure has mounted to loosen the whipping arrangements of 
parliamentary parties and to allow freer debates in the House, there is the 
increased likelihood of coalition parties having to tolerate independent 
stances being adopted by their MPs during parliamentary debates. In this 
sense, coalition governments will be more generally held to account by the 
whole of Parliament rather than simply a single opposition party or group of 
parties. Political Scientist Nigel Roberts sees advantages in multi-party 
involvement in framing legislation. "A bill might end up quite different from 
what the Government put up, but with much wider public support in the end 
because the controversial clauses get bargained through by the parties."113 
In the era of MMP, opposition members may gain rights and privileges that 
have customarily resided only with government members. Rather than 
simply listening to the concerns of opposition parties, the government could 
potentially be obliged to consider including opposition bills on the legislative 
timetable. The Standing Orders Committee is currently considering changing 
the rule that prevents non-Government members from proposing measures 
that would increase Budget spending.11 4 
IV PROPORTIONS IN THE HOUSE 
A significant new quality of the MMP House of Representatives will be the 
fact that its composition potentially offers a greater reflection of popular 
opinion than has been possible under the duopoly of recent decades. As 
such, the MMP House becomes less of a forum for two-party wrangles and 
more of a forum for airing the diversity of arguments and views present in 
the nation. In ignoring the views of any particular opposition party, the 
government ignores the representatives of at least five per cent of the 
electorate. It would also be ignoring one of the reasons behind the 
Prime Minister Jim Bolger as quoted in "The Reality of MMP" The Evening Post, 
llington, New Zealand, 12 July 1995, 9. 
1 " . See "Boomtimes for MMP Inc." Sunday Star-Times, Wellington , New Zealand, 16 July 
10%, C1. 
See "Papering over the cracks in the House" Sunday Star-Times, Wellington, New 
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constitutional changes to MMP: greater accountability of government due to 
the representation of more views in parliament. This may be of no account to 
a single party government that is very secure in its command of a majority in 
the House. However, in a parliamentary environment in which majorities 
cannot be taken for granted, parties both large and small will be respected 
and consulted. In fact, with the expected decline of duopolistic domination of 
the House, parties are not to be viewed only as alternative governments to 
each other. Instead, other parties become potential coalition partners either 
on particular motions or in government. 
Parties themselves may change significantly due to the need to form 
coalitions. Hailsham has noted that parties are "the product of the voting 
system" and are "groupings designed to produce results under the existing 
system". 115 A multi-party parliament will forge inter-party co-operation. 
Coalitions, either as ongoing relationships or as temporary alliances for 
particular divisions, are a political necessity. 
V ROLE OF MEMBERS IN MMP PARLIAMENT 
Hailsham, in reference to Burke, points out that representative government 
is not the same as representation by delegates obliged to follow the 
mandate of electors. Members should follow their conscience and not be 
coerced by others, even parties. He posits "the orthodox purity" of 
representative government as decisions being taken collectively by simple 
majority vote taken after debate; individual votes are influenced by 
argument. 11 6 Taken to its logical conclusion, every individual member of 
Parliament is a free agent entitled to stand apart or join coalitions with other 
individuals or parties. Individual members are coalitionable. This has been 
evidenced by the inclusion of the Right of Centre leader Ross Meurant in the 
National executive. 
Burke's view of the member's role 
Members of Parliament are not to be viewed simply as obedient messengers 
from their parties or electorates. Edmund Burke perceived Parliament as a 
Above n 6, 183, 184. 
Above n 6, 99. 
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place where members could think tor themselves and be receptive to 
contrary views: 117 
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile 
interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, 
against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative 
assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not 
local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, 
resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member 
indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not [a] member of Bristol , 
but he is a member of parliament. 
Burke felt the wishes of the electorate should have great weight with the 
member. The member should put the interests of the constituents above the 
member's own interests: 
But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened 
conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you; to any man, or to any set of 
men living .. . Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his 
judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to 
your opinion. 
Burke finds justification tor the member's independence of mind within the 
mechanism by which laws are developed: 
[G]overnment and legislation are matters of reason and judgement, and 
not of :nclination; and what sort of reason is that, in which the 
determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men 
deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion 
are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the 
arguments? 
Burke addressed his argument tor an intelligent, deliberative, role tor 
members in the House to his own constituents. Given the advent of the 
'elective dictatorship' and the advent of disciplined voting, Burke's argument 
From a speech delivered by Edmund Burke at Bristol on being elected to Parliament 
• that city, November 1774. See AMD Hughes Edmund Burke Selections (1921 )62-65. Cited 
VI Chen and G Palmer Public Law in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
I v93) 604-605. 
-
I 
I 
• 
• 
• 
48 
is equally applicable to the proponents of caucus and cabinet control over 
members' behaviour in the House. Burke's view runs counter to strict party 
discipline. It appears to advocate an 'issue by issue' approach to debate and 
legislation. Such an approach suits a parliamentary style of 'jumping 
majorities' where, instead of relying on guaranteed majorities based on 
disciplined voting, proponents of bills seek the support of members of both 
the government and opposition parties. 
VI LACK OF DISCIPLINE IN THE HOUSE 
A former Prime Minister, David Lange, has noted a decline in party discipline 
in the House of Representatives but, in terms that are contrary to those of 
Burke, questions whether it represents a triumph for parliamentary 
democracy: 118 
The price of Parliament's supremacy will be the loss of coherent 
government. If every MP has a licence to pursue his or her own interests, 
or claims the right to assert his or her own judgment, there is small 
chance of advancing the considered policy of a coherent and disciplined 
collective ... Parliament, without such discipline, would be like a perpetual 
conscience vote , a legislative lottery ... No government could carry out its 
programme. 
The vital question here centres around the issue of when a member should 
be free to exercise personal judgment in Parliament. The outcome of this 
question has a real bearing on a member's allegiance to any collective the 
member belongs to. The member's party, caucus, and cabinet are all 
collectives to which members have traditionally deferred. In the age of MMP, 
the coalition will almost certainly be an added factor. 
In the case of a maximum winning coalition cabinet which commands the 
votes of a majority of members in the House, the consequently depleted 
Opposition ranks may derive longer term benefit from the situation . Wood 
notes of the National Government coalition 1915-19:11 9 
118 See "The chaos of partisanship" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 14 August 
1995, 6 . 
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[T]he coalition gave a powerful boost to the development of Labour as an 
independent parliamentary force. The New Zealand Labour Party, formed 
in 1916, was able to capitalize on its monopoly of opposition by 
denouncing the policies of the coalition ... 
While such a development depends on the political circumstances applying 
at any one time, there is a political dynamic generated by majority 
governments which fosters the formation of shadow alternative government 
within the opposition ranks. 
Vil OPPOSITION 
A Coalition as an Opposition Tool 
Just as coalition is one of the only means of securing a majority in a multi-
party parliament, so too is coalition one of the only means of forming a 
coherent opposition to government in a multi-party government. In fact, the 
degree to which opposition parties can work together and demonstrate the 
potential to coalesce is a measure of parliament's potential to offer an 
alternative government to that of the incumbent. Accountability in the broad 
sense of the word relies on conventions and practices. It is strongly 
dependent on the power of the House, through its individual members and 
constituent parties, to insist on consultation; in the extreme case, to replace 
the existing government party or coalition. 
B Consultation 
Consultation between parties is a device by which governments can 
legitimise, and indicate support for, their policies. It is a means by which 
policies can be endorsed by others and shown to be not merely the products 
of a narrow few who happen to hold the reins of power at a given moment. 
In Britain, the House of Lords provides a check and balance on the 
legislation produced by the House of Commons. Hailsham claims that 
"people would not tolerate a sovereign legislature with unlimited powers of 
which it was itself the only organ".120 The New Zealand people has tolerated 
such a legislature for nearly half a century. However, key elements within 
Above n 6, 149. 
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the New Zealand constitution which have acted as organs of accountability 
include the strengthened select committee system, the greater number of 
parties in the House, statutes facilitating more open government, and the 
increased consultation that appears to be a hallmark of the MMP era. 
Legislation developed in such a consultative environment can only reflect 
the diversity of viewpoints present in the House. 
C Threat of Coalitions 
Parliament is also the source of coalitions, and while two parties may 
coalesce in order to dominate Parliament, it is always possible that new 
coalitions, even involving former members of the coalition government, may 
be formed at any time from within the opposition ranks in the Hou_se. The 
ability of opposition parties to form coalitions and hence offer themselves as 
potential alternative governments to the current one, is a key way in which 
coalition governments can be held accountable. This opposition potential to 
form new governments is greater during the term of a minority government 
since the opposition holds the required numbers to form a majority 
government if it so resolved. 
D Coalitions Protect Minorities 
Hailsham notes that while representative government "may hope" to defend 
the majority of people against arbitrary government by the minority, it cannot 
protect minorities against arbitrary government by the majority. 121 The 
vulnerability of minorities is "diminished" where there is a plurality of parties 
in the House, each with a chance of winning some divisions. Even so, he 
notes, even with a plurality of parties, "representative government cannot 
adequately defend individual or minority groups which are not in a position to 
enforce their will". Even in the year preceding the first MMP election, there 
has been a noticeable increase in the amount of consultation that has 
occurred between parties, and most significantly, between the main 
government party and opposition parties. This consultation is the key means 
by which accountability is demonstrated in the context of parties. 
Above n 6, 102. 
• 
l 
I 
51 
The Prime Minister may not necessarily be the leader of any individual party. 
Where the Prime Minster commands such support by virtue of coalition, the 
Prime Minister is left accountable to coalition partners on an almost daily 
basis . Rather than having a free hand in choosing the cabinet, a coalition 
Prime Minister will consult with the partners "building on the principles and 
conventions" already established for single-party majority governments.122 
VIII SELECT COMMITTEES 
One of the most significant ways in which parliament has been able to gain 
in power in relation to the executive has been through the select committee 
system. In scrutinising bills and conducting independent inquiries , the 
committees have assumed substantial influence over the content of 
legislation and the administration of government departments and other 
governmental bodies. 
Earlier in the paper, it was noted that the unicameral nature of the New 
Zealand legislature made it more vulnerable to elective dictatorship than a 
bi-cameral system. Select committees are a valuable tool for holding the 
executive accountable, not just because of the powers of the committees but 
also because agencies and individuals are able to make submissions to 
them. They are thus vehicles for participatory democracy. Commentators 
have already described the committees as "effectively a second chamber of 
Parliament, since the Government has lost the numbers to control them, and 
all legislation is at their mercy". 123 In July, 1995 the seven-member Internal 
Affairs Committee included representatives from five parties.124 
The presence of a greater number of parties in the House in the age of MMP 
can only favour greater consultation between the executive and opposition 
parties. In 1995, the Senior Opposition Whip suggested that the reason the 
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Government was compromising on legislation was because "they are 
uncertain about their majority". 125 
Select committees are made up of small groups of parliamentarians who 
work hard on the business at hand. In the period of two party dominance, 
the government party was always able to ensure it had a majority on each 
committee. Now that the committees sometimes have several parties 
present, they are less vulnerable to dominance by a single party. The 
diversity of viewpoints present in such an intimate work group creates a 
greater opportunity for minority viewpoints to be heard and reflected in 
committee recommendations. It will increasingly difficult for a single-party 
government to control select committees. If there is a powerful need to co-
ordinate the work or the policy of the committees, majority coalition 
government may be the only option. 
The traditional two-party parliament with its rigid adversarial administration 
offered a very narrow range of viewpoints. Having more parties represented 
in Parliament facilitates greater openness. In a multi-party system, with a 
Parliament that "reflected something of the diversity found within society", 
the exercise of government becomes much more complicated.126 However, 
the advantage that MMP and coalition government offer are levels of 
accountability not experienced during the course of the elective dictatorship. 
The "dilemma" of democracy is replaced by the diversity of democracy. 
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VII SUMMARY 
This paper has considered the issue of accountability when applied to 
coalition government. 
It has defined coalition in terms of the formal sharing of power by parties. It 
also acknowledges the constant coalition-building that characterises a 
parliament less constrained by the duopoly of two major parties. 
The paper has offered a broad definition of accountability that considers 
government's responsibilities in the act of governing rather than simply in 
terms of political accountability. Key features of accountable government in 
these terms include a participatory democracy, openness of government, 
inter-party co-operation, and the general diffusion of power. 
In explaining this broad concept of accountability, the paper has sought 
illumination by considering constitutional frameworks that have failed to 
produce true accountability. In particular, the paper has discussed the 
concept of the elective dictatorship as described by Lord Hailsham and Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer. The elective dictatorship is characterised by unlimited 
power held by the a single party executive; the lack of checks and balances 
usually offered by an upper house or a written constitution; often two major 
parties who alternate in power and tend to reverse each other's policies; lack 
of consultation with other parties; and the general inability of minority 
interests and parties to have any effect on the direction of government. 
The paper has given a historical background to the Electoral Act 1993. 
Successive governments in the 1980's abandoned election promises and 
proceeded to govern in the manner of 'elective dictatorships'. A guaranteed 
majority in Parliament ensured executive dominance. The government 
appeared unaccountable either to Parliament or to its public undertakings to 
the electorate. 
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In contrast to the lack of accountability evidenced in the elective dictatorship, 
this paper has focused on the enhanced accountability entailed by MMP. In 
particular, coalition government is considered as a mechanism by which 
governments will be most accountable in a constitutional sense. 
The paper has considered the factors required for a coalition-building 
environment: notably, the willingness of parties to work together and for 
individual members of parliament to sometimes stand apart from party 
loyalties. To illustrate the possibility of these features, the paper has cited 
examples from the ministries of Stafford, Vogel and Dommett in the colonial 
era prior to the emergence of the major parties, and also the three periods in 
the 20th century when New Zealand has seen coalition government. 
This paper has presented analysis as to why coalition government is more 
possible under the electoral framework provided by the Electoral Act 1993. 
Since a coalition government, by definition, involves more than one party in 
government, it will challenge long-standing conventions and practices 
surrounding cabinet, caucus and Parliament. 
The paper has considered the role of the Prime Minister. As the leader, the 
Prime Minister will be required to demonstrate supreme skills of political 
management in order to reconcile and respect the different viewpoints 
present in the cabinet. This especially applies to the public articulation of 
coalition policy. The nature of coalition government establishes a new set of 
variables to the constitutional framework surrounding cabinet government.-
The paper has noted the enhanced power of a multi-party parliament to 
determine governments. While a multi-party cabinet more accurately reflects 
the diversity of parliament, it is not an exact reflection and there will always 
be a tension between the two. Parliament has increasing power over 
legislation through the multi-party select committee system as well as 
proposed changes to standing orders whereby non-government members 
may propose bills entailing budget spending. 
While factors of political management make disciplined voting more complex 
under coalition government, a coalition government with a parliamentary 
majority has - in terms of numbers on the floor of the House - as much 
• 
• • 
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potential to behave like an elective dictatorship as governments elected 
under the provisions of the Electoral Act 1956. 
Whereas political accountability rests on the performance of election 
promises, constitutional accountability depends more on a style of 
governing . Accountable government features consultation with other parties, 
openness, and willingness to listen to others. Coalition government is 
accountable in these terms due to the inter-dependency it requires between 
In essence, the paper posits that coalition government delivers greater 
levels of accountability not only because of the presence of more that a 
single party in cabinet, but also because coalition government is likely to 
occur in an era of greater inter-party co-operation and participatory 
democracy . 
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